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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Three experiments were done with the Cornfield System operating in an 
air defense context in a fully automatic mode. In each experiment the 
system was programmed to do automatic threat evaluation, weapon selection, 
and weapon control. The program--ICON II in the Illiac computer--also 
made automatic recordings of four aspects of system performance: target
penetrations, target kills, kill distance, and weapon assignments.
Experiment I studied the effects of three variables, and their inter­
actions, on the system: target load, defense strategy, and number of
weapons. Load was simulated in three 50-minute scripts containing 22, 29, 
and 57 targets, respectively. Defense strategy was varied in two ways: 
all weapons (interceptors) were treated equally and were disposed on a 
circle 50 miles distant from the protected point; or, of the available 
weapons, one was put on restricted assignment status and stationed over 
the protectee while the remaining fighters were distributed symmetrically. 
Number of weapons available varied from 5 through 6.
Results of Experiment I were as follows:
a. As target loads increased there were more bombings, more targets 
killed, and more weapon assignments made.
b. Load did not affect kill range.
c. Adding interceptors resulted in fewer bombings, more kills, 
greater kill distance, and more assignments and deassignments of weapons.
d. Use of defense-in-depth strategy (i.e. one restricted interceptor) 
produced fewer bombings, fewer kills of non-critical targets, and a de­
crease in average kill range.
e . Heavy target loads had a more adverse effect on performance when 
the number of available weapons was low.
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f. Kill distances remained relatively constant from one load to 
another for each number of interceptors employed except in the case of 3 
fighters. In the latter situation, as loads increased the average kill 
range also increased, probably because the small number of available 
weapons got out to extended distances and never were free long enough to 
return to station.
g. The increase in the number of weapon assignments with greater 
loads and more weapons was not linear. As both target numbers and numbers 
of available weapons increased, the frequency of assignments and deassign­
ments was relatively higher. This probably reflected the computer's 
greater activity in making continuous pairings of all weapon/target comb­
inations.
h. The defense-in-depth strategy was most effective when only 3 or 
k weapons were available.
Experiment II tested the hypothesis that data samples of four runs 
would yield essentially the same results as samples of 10 runs of the 
Cornfield System. A single script containing 60 targets, and lasting 30 
minutes, was run against the system programmed to operate fully automa­
tically. Six interceptors were used in each run. Results supported the 
hypothesis since the observed differences between the two sample sizes 
were slight and not statistically significant. This held for each of four 
measures of system performance.
Experiment III tested the hypothesis that a particular script— the 
one used in Experiment II— could be divided into three 10-minute scripts 
and that results from each of these would be comparable with their counter­
parts in the longer script. This hypothesis was verified for all but one 
of 22 comparisons made.
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INTRODUCTION
For about two years this laboratory has carried on a program of 
experimentation with a complex computer system, known as Cornfield, in 
the area of tactical decision making. In 1958 an experiment— ARTFUL—  
investigating the performance of Cornfield under varying degrees of human 
intervention was done . As a result of this experiment and other local 
experience with the system, many questions arose regarding the possible 
effects certain variables would have on the Cornfield System or other 
similar systems.
Since the performance of Cornfield was generally very good in the 
ARTFUL experiment irrespective of whether the system operated in a fully 
automatic mode or with some degree of human intervention, questions about 
the way the simulated air defense battle was fought were raised. Haw 
would the system perform if a different defense strategy, i.e. disposi­
tion of weapons, were employed? How much of the behavior of the system 
was due to the particular script (number of pattern of attacking raids) 
used in ARTFUL? Would Cornfield’s ability to "fight the battle" have 
changed if more defensive weapons had been available? And, what sorts 
of interactions, if any, would there have been between these variables? 
This report summarizes a series of essperiments conducted during the past 
15 months, which was set up to answer these and other questions. All 
runs of the system were done in a fully automatic mode since the focus 
was primarily on electronic, rather than human, components of the system.
* See CSL Report R-IO^ J-
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METHOD
The System
*The Cornfield System has been described in detail previously . The 
present series of experiments concentrated on the control and decision­
making functions of the system. These included automatic threat evalua-
yn
tion, weapon selection and assignment, and weapon control. The ICON II 
Control program was used in all runs. No manual intervention was per­
mitted in any of the runs in this series so that all results are those 
for a truly "untouched-by-human-hands" system.
System Mission
The task of Cornfield during these experiments was identical with 
that in ARTFUL: the system was to defend a vital area, 20 miles in
diameter. At the start of each run interceptors were stationed 30 miles 
from the force center on bearings that provided equal azimuthal coverage. 
That is, when three interceptors were used they were stationed at 120° 
bearings from center, five interceptors would be stationed at 72° bearings, 
and so on. Any target which penetrated the 20-mile vital area would be 
counted as a bombing. As described earlier, interceptors were automat­
ically assigned and vectored and, following kills or deassignments for 
other reasons, were automatically vectored back to their stations and 
orbited there.
Target Generation
Defensive weapons, in all cases synthetic maneuverable interceptors, 
were simulated in two ways. Early in the series 15J-1C target generators,
* See CSL Reports R-35, R-36.
** See CSL Report R-10^, Appendix B; CSL Report R-106 (in press).
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each "flown'1 by a member of the laboratory staff, received control orders 
automatically from the Illiac . During the last two-thirds of the experi­
ments automatically generated interceptors were used instead of the less 
reliable mechanical 15J-1C units. Scripts containing pre-programmed raids 
were generated from punched type inputs to the TASC computer via a stand­
ard tape reader. Interceptions of targets were evaluated by Illiac, which 
were programmed to apply a range criterion in order to judge the success 
of attempted kills. As in the ARTFUL experiment the kill criterion was 
five-miles between an interceptor and its target. When an interception 
attempt was judged successful by Illiac a signal to the tracking computer 
erased the target so that it neither appeared on the displays nor was re­
considered by the threat evaluation routine of the control program.
Data Recording
As was done in ARTFUL, an automatic data observing and recording pro­
gram (DOPE) was used to measure and summarize the results of each run.
The following information was recorded by DOPE; assignments of inter­
ceptors to raids and deassignments of interceptors from raids. For each 
of these classes of events, the time, identity of raid and interceptor, 
position of interceptor were recorded. Also, automatic statistical and 
sorting routines were used to tabulate and summarize the DOPE recordings. 
These routines computed such measures as mean and standard deviation of 
kill range, number of each type of deassignment, and the like.
Scripts
The influence of scripts was one of the principal variables investi­
gated in these experiments and several different scripts were used. Table 
1 summarizes script characteristics.' Ail scripts were 50-minutes long,.1 ' \ ii
had in common a 125 mile radius radar range,, and all targets - produced
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strong signals with no background noise. With few exceptions, most of the 
nearly three hundred mans in these experiments were limited to the first
Table 1
Summary of Script Characteristics
SCRIPT NUMBER OF TARGETS DESCRIPTION
33N 22 total ^ 
10 critical
Omni-direction; speeds 300-650 
knots.
OLN 29 total 
13 critical
Same as 33N with 7 added targets
INN 37 total 
17 critical
Same as OLN with 8 added targets
2K0 6q total 
all critical
Three waves of 20 targets each
2K2 20 total , 
all critical
Wave 1 of 2KD script; omni­
directional, turning targets, 
400^-800 knots
2Kk 20 total 
all critical
Wave 2 ôf 2KQ script;4omhi- , 
directional, groups of targets, 
400-800 knots ,
2K6 20 total 
all critical
Wave 3 of 2K0 script; omni­
directional, all radial (straight
in) targets, 400-800 knots
* Critical targets are those which were programmed to penetrate the vital 
zone if not successfully intercepted.
three scripts in Table 1: 33N, OLN, and INN. The first of these--33N~
was the so-called "heavy load" script used in the ARTFUL experiment and the 
other two scripts were modifications of 33N made by adding targets.
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Dependent Variables
Several measures of system performance were derived from the DOPE 
observations. For each experimental condition the system was run four 
times so that performance measures would provide variance estimates as well 
as averages* Results of the experiments will be reported in terms of the 
following measures:
a* Penetrations» This was a tabulation of the number of raids 
reaching the 20-mile vital zone.
b . Kill range* The average (mean) range of kills in miles for all 
targets judged successfully intercepted.
c. Kills. The total number of targets killed.
d Assignments 
to targets.
The number of pairings or assignments of weapons
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EXPERIMENT I: EFFECTS OF TARGET LOAD, DEFENSE STRATEGY, AND NUMBER
OF AVAILABLE WEAPONS
The major experiment in this series was an investigation of the effects 
of three variables on the performance of the Cornfield System. These var­
iables, and the conditions under which they were introduced were as 
follows:
a. Target load. This refers to the number of raids flown against 
the system* Target load was controlled by the use of three different 
scripts containing totals of 22, 29, and 37 targets each. These scripts 
were 33N, OLN, and INN and will be referred to in later sections as light, 
moderate, and heavy, respectively. (See Table 1 for description of the 
scripts•)
b* Defense strategy* This variable had to do with the stationing 
of interceptors and the rules by which they could be assigned automatr- 
ically by the ICON II program. Under one condition, all interceptors 
were disposed at equidistant angles along a 30-mile ring stirrounding the 
vital area; the control program treated each interceptor as having equal 
assignment capability in terms of the criteria used to select weapons.
This first condition of defense strategy will be referred to as 
"symmetrical". The second condition, known as "defense-in-depth" (D.I.D.), 
always kept one of the available interceptors on a restricted assignment 
status with its station directly over the center of the vital area. The 
remaining interceptors were disposed symmetrically. Under the D.I.D. 
condition ICON II was programmed to assign the overhead fighter only as 
a backstop, with assignments permitted only when the kill could occur with­
in 20 miles distance from the protectee.
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Co Number of available weaponso Four variations in the number of 
interceptors used were: 3, k, 5, or 6. In the symmetrical defense
mode all interceptors had stations distributed equally on the 30-mile 
circle (i.e. at 120°, 90°, 72°, or 60° separations)« In D.I.D. runs 
all but the restricted fighters were distributed similarly on the 30- 
mile circle«
General
Results of the ejqperiment are shown graphically in Figures 1, 2, 3, 
and 4, (Appendix A contains tables which present averages for each 
measure of performance in terms of the major independent variables«)
Target Load
With the exception of the kill range measure, all differences be­
tween load levels were statistically significant at the 1 o/o level of 
confidence« (Appendix B contains analysis of variance tables«) In 
general, increased target loads resulted in more bombings, more targets 
killed (but proportionally fewer kills to the total number of targets 
available), and an increase in weapon assignments and deassignments 
about proportional to the increase in targets« Average kill range did 
not vary significantly with load«
Number of Interceptors
For each performance measure there were statistically significant 
differences as the number of weapons was increased: raid penetrations
dropped, more targets were killed, average kill ranges increased, and 
the number of assignments and deassignments increased. In the latter 
case the change was not linear, the major difference occurring when 
the number of available interceptors went from 3 to 4.
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33 N 
( Light)
OLN
(Moderate)
No. of Interceptors
INN
(Heavy)
FIGURE 1 TARGET PENETRATIONS AS A FUNCTION OF LOAD, 
DEFENSE STRATEGY, AND NUMBER OF INTERCEPTORS.
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33 N 
(Light)
OLN
(Moderate)
INN
(Heavy)
FIGURE 2 TARGET KILLS ASA FUNCTION OF LOAD, DEFENSE 
STRATEGY. AND NUMBER OF INTERCEPTORS.
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3 4  5 6
No. of Interceptors
33N
OLN
FIGURE 4 FREQUENCY OF WEAPON ASSIGNMENT AS A FUNCTION OF 
LOAD, DEFENSE STRATEGY, AND NUMBER OF INTERCEPTORS
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Defense Mode
Three of the four measures showed statistical significant differences 
between the defense-in-depth and symmetrical distributions of weapon 
stations. These effects were as follows: during D.I.D. runs there were '
fewer bombings, fewer target kills, and a shorter average kill range than 
under the symmetrical defense mode. Number of weapon assignments made 
did not vary significantly between these conditions.
Interaction Effects
In addition to the above effects of the three main experimental
YQ2*iables, there were also statistically significant interactions between
*certain of these variables. Following are those interactions which were 
significant at the 1 o/o level of confidence.
a. Number of weapons and target load interacted in terms of three 
of the four Treasures: total targets killed, kill range, and number of
assignments. With respect to target kills, at each load more intercept­
ors successfully shot-down more raids. But, the relative gain in perfor­
mance was greater as loads increased. (This effect is shown in Table 2)o
Table 2
Interaction of Number of Weapons and Target Load: 
Target Kills (Percentage of Total Targets)
LOAD 3
NUMBER
k
OF WEAPONS 
5 6
Light 68 o/o 77 o/o 86 0/0 91 0/0
Moderate 62 o/o 77 o/o 0
oj00 87 0/0
Heavy 57 o/o 69 O/O 00 fO 0 0 85 0/0
* Interactions are variations in the data due to combined effects of two 
or more experimental conditions. , .. ~ ^
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In other words, heavier scripts did not affect the system as adversely 
when more weapons were available as when only a few interceptors were 
provided.
Average range at which targets were killed, as a function of load 
and number of weapons, is shown in Table 5.
Table 5
Interaction of Number of Weapons and Target Load:
Average Kill Range (Miles)
LOAD 3
NUMBER
*4
OF WEAPONS
5 6
Light 29.0 5*4.8 *10.9 *4-1.9
Moderate 50.0 33.3 36.5 *41.8
Heavy 56.0 5*4.*4 37.0 *42.0
The interaction effect here is a curious one: with only three inter­
ceptors available the average kill range increased as target loads built 
up. And, while at each load level the average kill range was greater 
for more interceptors, increases in target load did not result in greater 
kill ranges for *4, or 6 interceptors.
With respect to the frequency of weapon assignments, these always 
increased as target loads went up. However, as more weapons were 
available relatively more assignments and deassignments were made. For 
example, in light load script runs 52 and 29 assignments were made for 
5 and 5 interceptors, respectively. At heavy loads assignments went to 
^9 and 68 for 5 and 5 interceptors. This relationship is shown in Table 
If.
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Table 4
Interaction of Number of Weapons and Target load: 
Weapon! Assignments
LOAD 3
NUMBER
k
OF WEAPONS
5 6
Light 31.6 38.0 29.I 26.0
Moderate ^5-3 kQ. 5 43-3 39-6
Heavy ^9*3 60.3 67.6 63.I
b. There were also three significant interactions between the number 
of weapons and defense mode variables« First, while raid penetrations were 
higher when fewer interceptors were available, this effect was most pro­
nounced in the symmetrical defense mode« Put another way, the D«I«D« 
strategy was most effective when relatively few weapons were available.
With as many as 6 interceptors no raids penetrated under either defense mode. 
Table 5 shows this effect.
Table 5
Interaction of Number of Weapons and Defense Mode:
Raid Penetrations
NUMBER OF WEAPONS
DEFENSE MODE 3 k 5 6
Symmetrical 2.8 1.7 0.3 : 0.0
D.I.D. 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0
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It has been shown earlier that, in general, average kill ranges decreased 
when the D.I.D. mode was used (because of the restricted status of the 
overhead interceptor). However, with more interceptors available, average 
kill ranges tended not to drop as much under D.I.D. conditions. This was 
probably because the restricted interceptor did relatively little when 5 
or 6 interceptors were provided. Table 6 summarizes this interaction.
Table 6
Interaction of Number of Weapons and Defense Mode:
Kill Range (Miles)
DEFENSE MODE 3
NUMBER OF WEAPONS
4 5 6
Symmetrical 34.8 36.3 41.5 42.8
D.I.D. 28.ô 32.0 34.8 40.9
The third interaction between number of interceptors and defense mode 
occurred in terms of weapon assignments. The effect here was an unusual 
one: with 3 or 4 interceptors the frequency of weapon assignments was
lower in D.I.D* than in symmetrical disposition runs; with 5 or 6 inter­
ceptors this effect was reversed. There is no readily apparent explanation 
for this. Table 7 shows the data to illustrate this interaction.
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Table 7
Interaction of Number of Weapons and Defense Mode: 
Weapon Assignments
NUMBER OF WEAPONS
DEFENSE MODE 3 i
4 5f 6
■ .. ■■■• ■ "i ----
Symmetrical 44.8 51.6 44.4 41.6
ij.I.D. 39*2 46.2 48.9 1(2,3
113-23
EXPERIMENT II: VALIDITY OF FOUR-RUN VS. TEN-RUN DATA SAMPLES
Background
This experiment was done to verify the assumption that as few as four 
runs of the Cornfield System under any unique condition would provide 
stable data which could be compared statistically with other unique condi- 
tions. In the present study we were concerned only with data samples 
from the automatic mode of operating Cornfield. No comparison of runs were 
made with human operators in the system so inferences about the validity of 
small samples (four runs) should not be made concerning man-operated systems.
Method
The Cornfield System was operated in the fully automatic mode against
a script (2K0) containing 60 critical targets. Six interceptors were used
in a symmetrical defense disposition. Measures of raid penetration, target
kills, kill range, and weapon assignments were made automatically. The
entire experiment consisted of ten runs. In order to text the validity of
four-run samples data from the first four runs were compared statistically
**with that from all ten runs.
Results
Comparison of the two samples for each of four measures is shown in 
Table 8. None of the mean differences was statistically significant
* This assumption underlay both the ARTFUL and CAREFUL experiments which 
have been published as CSL Reports R-104 and R-115, respectively.
** Fisher’s t was used to test differences between means. The formula for 
t is:
t = -----
V i + h2°; 
H1 + ®2 " 2
K1 + V
N?2
2 2wh*ere M^ and are the sample means, and a2 are the corresponding 
variances, and N^ and N^ are the numbers of cases in each sample.
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Tat le 8
Comparison of Four-run and Ten-run Data Samples
MEASURE MEAN* T SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCE
Raid Penetrations 20.5
18.9 ; n
Not Significant
Target Kills 59-8 
in .2 •33
Not Significant
Kill Range 30.0
30.4
Not Significant
Assignments 131.0
123*7 .07
Not Significant
* Top mean is that for four-runs, bottom mean is for ten-runs.
indicating that the two samples, i.e. four and ten runs, may be considered 
to have been drawn from the same population.
We would conclude from this the fact that it was a sound procedure, 
in our operations of the fully automatic mode of the Cornfield System, to 
use samples as amai1 as four runs. Whether small samples involving humans 
as sources of variability would be as stable is not known. It is likely, 
however, that factors such as learning, boredom, fatigue, and motivation 
would operate to increase the variability of performance, and therefore, 
necessitate larger samples* At present we have no data to offer in this
regard
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EXPERIMENT III: COMPARISON OF SYSTEM OPERATION AGAINST WHOLE
AND PARTIAL SCRIPTS
Background
*The CAREFUL experiment used two target loads, or scripts, each of 
50-minutes duration • As in earlier experiments, all measures of system 
behavior were reported in terms of averages (means) over samples of the 
full 50-minute runs. Because of a number of practical problems such as 
the limited availability of the Illiac computer, runs of briefer duration 
would be desirable. The present experiment was a test of the hypothesis 
that results based on ten-minute runs would not differ significantly 
from those of longer (e.g. 50 minutes) runs where scripts in each case 
were comparable.
Method
The system was run only in the fully automatic mode. Measures of 
raid penetration, kills, kill range, and target assignments were made 
using the DOPE routine. In order to satisfy the assumption of compara­
bility between scripts for the longer and shorter runs we used the heavy 
load script (2K0) from CAREFUL as follows. Ten runs were made against 
the full thirty-minute script. The script was subdivided into three ten- 
minute scripts, each corresponding to one wave of 20 targets from the 
full 2KD script* Ten runs against each separate wave were made. Six 
interceptors in the symmetrical defense mode were used as weapons. The 
hypothesis that brief runs would yield results comparable to 50-minute 
runs was tested by comparing average scores for Wave 1 of 2K0 with the 
10-minute script of that wave alone, Wave 2 with its equal, and so on.
* See CSL Report R-115
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Fisher’s t-test was used to test the significance of mean differences.
Results
Tables 9, 10, and 11 summarize the comparison of measures for the 
three waves of the 2K0 script with scripts 2K2, 2Kb, and 2k6 (correspond­
ing to Wave 1, Wave 2, and Wave 3 of 2K0). Of the twelve pairs of 
averages tested only one was of borderline statistical significance (5 o/o 
level) and one other approached significance (10 o/o level).
Table 9
Comparison of Short Duration Script with Portion of 
Longer Duration Script: I
MEASURE MEAN* t SIGNIFICANCE
Raid Penetrations 6.9
6.9 0.0
Not Significant
Target Kills 1 3 .k
13.2 0.22
Not Significant
Kill Range 35.2
35.0 0.97
Not Significant
Assignments ^3.5
50.7 1.63
Not Significant
* Top mean is for Wave 1, 2K0; bottom mean is for 10 minute script, 2K2
We have concluded from this experiment that it was valid, in obtain­
ing data on the fully automatic system, to divide the 30-minute 2K0 script 
into three 10-minute scripts corresponding to the three waves of 2KD. It 
is important to recognize, however, that brief scripts may not, in other 
situations, be sufficient to exercise the system in all its aspects.
* See Footnote, page 23
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Table 10
Comparison of Short Duration Script with Portion of 
Longer Script: II
MSASURE MEAN* t SIGNIFICANCE
Raid Penetrations 2.3
0.9 2.13
5 o/o level
Target Kills 17.8
19.1 2.09
10 o/o level
Kill Range 27.1
27.8 0.64
Not Significant
Assignments 55.1
52.1 o.8i
Not Significant
* Top mean is for 
2k4.
Wave 2, 2KP; bottom mean is for 10-minute script,
I .
Table 11
. . . . . .  . _ ,  _
Comparison of Short Duration Script with Portion of 
Longer Script: III
MEASURE MEAN* t SIGNIFICANCE
Raid Penetrations 9.7
9*5: 0.28
Not Significant
Target Kills 10 .2- 
10.7 0.7^
Not Significant
Kill Range 30.8
30.2 0.55
Not Significant
Assignments 26.1
28.2 0.86
Not Significant
* Top mean is for Wave 3> 2K0; 
2K6.
bottom mean is for 10-minute script,
115-28
ACKNCWLBDGBMBNTS
The authors would like to express their appreciation to the follow­
ing colleagues who contributed materially to these experiments#
C. H. Beigh conducted most of the early runs of Experiment I.
Mrs# Julia Berger and R. F. MacFarlane assisted in the production 
of the report.
H# G. Bobotek and P. G# Braunfeld were responsible for the initial 
ICON II program and its associated DOFS routines#
R# M# Brown, J# L# Divilbiss, L. S. Kypta, J. B. Stifle, and R. L. 
Trogdon were professional staff members whose contributions were 
generally in the area of equipment design, construction, and modi­
fication for these experiments# R. M. Brown also read the initial 
manuscript and made many valuable suggestions*
G. P# Cartwright served as laboratory assistant, computer operator, 
and statistical aide#
D. B# Coad and B. Neff were responsible for technical maintenance 
of the Cornfield System.
Mrs# Sandi Goldberg performed statistical analyses early in the 
experiments•
Miss Charlene Sprankel served as computer operator during Experiment 
I#
115-29
APPENDIX A
DATA TABLES FOR EXPERIMENT I
Table A-l
Effects of Target Load on System Performance
MEASURE* LIGHT
TARGET LOAD 
MODERATE HEAVY
Target Penetrations 0.28 °»91 ; 1.05 „< >-w
Number of Targets Killed 17.69 22.56 ... , 27.10
Kill Range (Miles) 56.62 55.38 , 37.34
Weapon Assignments 51.18 44-.16 60.06
* All figures are averages (means) for 52 runs under each script 
condition.
Table A-2
Effects of Number of Interceptors on System Performance
MEASURE* 5
NUMBER OF INTERCEPTORS
4 5 6
Target Penetrations 2.04 1.00 0.12 0.00
Number of Targets Killed 18.00 21.60 24.50 25.90
Kill Range (Miles) 51.60 54.12 58.10 4-1.90
Weapon Assignments 24-.04 48.90 46.66 42.91
* All figures are averages (means) for 24 runs with each number of 
interceptors•
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Table A-3
Effects of Defense Mode on System Performance
---- ----— - --------- T  DEFENSE MODE
MEASURE* SYMMETRICAL DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH
Target Penetrations 1.19 0.39
Number of Targets Killed 23.31 21.58
Kill Range (Miles) 38.83 34.06
Weapons Assignments 45.6o 44.66
* All figures are averages (means) for 46 runs under each defense mode*
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APPENDIX B
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLES FOR EXPERIMENT I
Table B-l
Analysis of Variance of Target Penetrations
SOURCE OF 
VARIATION
SUM OF 
SQUARES df
VARIANCE
ESTIMATE F-RATIO
Between number of Interceptors (A) 64.25 3 21.417 36.736**
Between scripts (B) 6.271 2 3.136 5.379**
Between defense inodes (C) 15.042 1 15.042 25.8**
Interactions:' A x B 9.812 6 1.635 2.804*
A x C 11.041 3 5*68
, ** 6.512
B x C 3.77 2 1.885 3.233*
A x B x C 5.647 6 .9>n 1.6l4
Within 42.0 72 .583
Total 157.833 95
** Significant at the 1 o/o level. 
* Significant at the 5 o/o level.
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Table B-2
Analysis of Variance of Target Kills
SOURCE
VARIATION
SUM OF 
SQUARES df
VARIANCE
ESTIMATE F-RATIO
Between number of interceptors (A) 863.116 3 287.705 139.257**
Between scripts (b ) 1415.27 2 707.635 342.515**
Between defense inodes (C) 71.76 1 71.76 3^.73^**
Interactions: A x B 86*729 6 Ilf .1*55
, ** 
6.997
A x C 20.91A 3 6.981 3.379*
B x C 2.523 2 1.262
A x B x C 2iw6l*8 6 1*.108 1.988
Within 148.75 72 2.066
Total 2633.74 95 -
** Significant at the 1 o/o level* 
* Significant at the 5 o/o level.
115-33
Table B-3
Analysis of Variance of Kill Range
SOURCE OF 
VARIATION
SUM OF 
SQUARES df
VARIANCE
ESTIMATE F-RATIO
Between number of Interceptors (A) 1452*53 3 1(84.18 70.27**
Between scripts (B) 63.521 2 31.76 4.6l*
Between defense modes (C) 546.26 1 546.26 79.28**
Interactions: A x B 267.57 6 44.6o 6.47**
A x C 85.70 3 28.57 . ** 4.15
B x C 42*15 2 21,08 5*06
A x  B x C 265*76 6 45.96 6.58**
Within 496.25 72 6.89
Total 5217.74 95
** Significant at 1 o/o level* 
* Significant at 5 o/o level*
113-3^
Table B-^
Analysis of Variance of Number of Weapon Assignments Made
SOURCE OF 
VARIATION
SUM OF 
SQUARES df
VARIANCE
ESTIMATE F-RATIO
Between number of interceptors (A) 7^7.28 3 2^9.09 7.08
Between scripts (B) 13586.27 2 6693.lh 190.2
Between defense modes (c) 21*09 1 21.09 •599
Interactions: A x B 167^.32 6 279.05
**7.93
A x C 500*79 3 166.93 4.74
B x C 72*57 2 36.29 1.03
A x B x C 519*17 6 86.53 2 M
Within 2533.75 72 35.19
Total 19^55,2k 95
** Significant at the 1 o/o level
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